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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
A Utah Corpora ti on, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
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W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions of Utah, 
BA0.'K OF UTAH, BANK OF BEN 
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BANK, rIRST SECURITY BANK 
OF UTAH, N.A., and 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11628 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County by plaintiff, Walker Bank and Trust 
Company, against the defendant W. S. Brimhall, as 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Utah, <here-
inafter generally referred to as Bank Commissioner, or 
Commissioner) to review a decision of the Bank Com-
missioner denying plaintiff's application for a branch 
bank to be located in South Ogden, Utah. The action is 
authorized by Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
The several defendant banks, who were protestants 
in the proceedings before the Bank Commissioner, inter-
vened as parties defendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff's motion For surnrnmy judgment \\as 
granted by Judge Ste\\'art M. 1 f anson in <l Memorandum 
Decision in \Hi ting under elate of March 18, 1 There-
after, and on March 20, 1969, Judge 1 lanson signed a11d 
entered his Declaratory Judgment ancl Decree \\hcrciiy 
he ( 1) set aside the Eank Cummissioner\ decision clem-
ing pl0intiff the branch in South Ogden, and (2) 
"ordered and directed (the Bank Commissioner) to gr:int 
the application of plaintiff * * * for the establishment 
of a branch bank in the City of South Ogden." 
The Findings, Conclusions and Order of the Bank 
Commissioner denying plaintiff's application, with the 
Opinion of the Attorney General appended thereto, and 
the judgment of the lower court are set out in the appen-
dix hereto. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
All defendants have joined in this appeal and join 
in this common brief. They seek to have the judgment 
of the lower court reversed, the order granting plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment set aside, plaintiff's action 
dismissed, or in the alternative, the case reinstated in the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basic facts are not in dispute. Essentially they 
are set out in the Commissioner's "Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions and Order" ( R. 5), and in the opinion of the 
Attorney General of Utah appended thereto <R. 8). 
Additionally, the lower court received into evidence the 






Con11111ss1oner ond transcript references herein refer to 
such transcript. The exhibits in the hearing before the 
Commissioner were not before the lower court, but 
certain thereof are included in the record on appeal by 
stipulation of the parties. When referred to herein they 
a1·c designated as Applicant's (Plaintiff) or Protestant's 
(Dcicndants) exhibits. 
Ogden City is a city of the second class, with a pop-
ulation of approximately 75,000. South Ogden City, a 
city of the third class with a population of approximately 
7,500 adjoins Ogden on the south. Thirty-sixth Street, 
running east and west, is the dividing line between the 
two municipalities, and Washington Boulevard is the 
main street running north and south through both South 
Ogden and Ogden. There is no city of the first class in 
Weber County. 
On March 21, 1968, plaintiff, a state banking cor-
poration with its principal office in Salt Lake City, filed 
its application with the Bank Commissioner for leave to 
establish a branch bank in South Ogden at a location on 
Washington Boulevard near 36th Street. Thus the pro-
posed location was at the extreme northerly edge of South 
Ogden, and immediately adjacent to the south boundary 
of Ogden. 
At this time Ogden had five unit banks located 
within its corporate limits, -Bank of Utah, Bank of Ben 
Lomond, Citizens National Bank, First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A., and Commercial Security Bank. In addition, 
First Security Bank and Commercial Security Bank each 
had a branch situated in Ogden. South Ogden had no 
unit banks located within its corporate limits, but Bank 
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of Utah, First Security Bank and Commercial Security 
Bank each had and have a branch located therein. 
Written protests to the application were filed by the 
five Ogden banks (all appellants herein), and the appli-
cation was duly noticed by the Commissioner for public 
hearing. At the commencement of the hearing, appel-
lants objected to the granting of the application upon 
the grounds that the primary objective of the proposed 
branch was not to serve South Ogden, where it was to 
be located, but rather to serve Ogden, where it was pro-
hibited by law from locating, and that the granting of 
the application under such circumstances would be con-
trary to law. Similar objections were interposed by appel-
lants at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, and again 
at the close of all the evidence. The Bank Commissioner 
took the objections under advisement, stating that he 
would seek the opinion of the Attorney General upon the 
legal question involved. 
Subsequently the Commissioner found as facts, the 
following matters here deemed pertinent: 
Plaintiff is one of the oldest and largest state char-
tered banks in Utah. Its main office is in Salt Lake City, 
and it has twelve branches in Salt Lake County. Addi-
tionally, it has branches in Price, Provo and Logan. 
(Finding 7, App. II>. 
Plaintiff has capital to the amount required by sta-
tute for each present branch, and the additional amount 
required for the proposed branch. (Finding 9, App. Ill. 
The economic effect of the proposed branch and its 
sources of business would encompass the Ogden Metro-
politan Area, which is comprised of Weber County and 
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Nzirth Davis County, including both incorporated and 
unincorporated areas therein. The Ogden Metropolitan 
Area is, for many purposes, a single economic and trade 
area, with Ogden as its major city. The area has experi-
enced considerable economic growth over the past sev-
eral years, and growth of the economy is likely to con-
tinue. (finding 16, !\pp. IV). 
Unit banks exist in the Ogden Metropolitan Area in 
the municipalities of Ogden, Clearfield, Layton and Kays-
ville. Additionally, one or more branch banks are estab-
lished in each of the municipalities of Ogden, North 
Ogden, South Ogden, Washington Terrace, Riverdale, 
Roy, Sunset, Clearfield, Syracuse and Layton (a total of 
fourteen branch banks), plus banking facilities at Hill 
Air force Base and Ogden Defense Depot. The estab-
lished banks and branches are financially sound and 
secure, and the establishment of new banks and branches 
in recent years has not prevented all banks from increas-
ing their loans resources. (Finding 11, App. ID. 
The proposed branch would supply the full range 
of banking services and would offer services to plaintiff's 
customers in facilitating inter-branch and between city 
banking transactions. (Finding 12, App. HO. 
Plaintiff bank has a number of existing customers 
in the Ogden Metropolitan Area. (finding 14, App. IID. 
The financial condition and history of plaintiff and 
its management demonstrate its capacity to successfully 
manage and operate the proposed branch. (finding 15, 
App. III). 
The Ogden Metropolitan Area has a population per 
banking office of 8,333 persons, compared with 6,247 for 
the state as a whole. (Conclusion 3, App. IV). 
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The public convenience and advantage would be 
subserved and promoted by the establishment of the 
branch at the location proposed, and the general public 
would be afforded the choice of another banking facility 
with substantially larger lending limits than any other 
state bank in the area. (Conclusion 4, App. V). 
The Commissioner further found that it was the 
contention of protestants that the establishment of the 
proposed branch would circumvent the branch banking 
law, because the primary objective of plaintiff in seeking 
a South Ogden location was not to serve the needs cind 
convenience of South Ogden, but rather to provide a 
facility that would compete with the banks in Ogden 
City. (Finding 17, App. IV). 
That the Attorney General of Utah in an opm1on 
to the Commissioner dated August 15, 1968, had ruled 
that as a matter of law a branch bank could not be estab-
lished by applicant at the location proposed, and that he 
(the Commissioner) deemed it proper to deny the appli-
cation upon the basis of the Attorney General's opinion 
(Conclusion 5, App. V). 
Additionally, there was direct testimony on behalf 
of plaintiff through its economist, J. Whitney Hanh, 
that the establishment of the proposed branch in South 
Ogden would serve the needs and convenience of the 
Ogden Metropolitan Area and in a broader sense, the 
needs and convenience of the entire Wasatch front. (Tr. 
73, 7 4, 76, 77, App. Ex. 1, Pg. 65). He further testified, 
the statutes notwithstanding (Tr. 79), that the public 
convenience and advantage is better served through 
branch banks than through unit banks, and that the 
state generally will benefit more from the establishment 
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of new branches of already established banks, than from 
the establishment of new unit banks. <Tr. 80, 84, 85, 
App. Ex. 1, Pg. 68). 
Also, that plaintiff had made no economic study of 
the needs or convenience of South Ogden, as South Og-
den's needs were deemed "irrelevant" <Tr. 89) and that 
"realistically" plaintiff was looking beyond South Ogden 
(Tr. 120). 
No finding was made by the Commissioner that the 
needs and convenience of that portion of the public com-
prising South Ogden would be in any way advantaged 
by the establishment of the proposed branch within its 
corporate limits. Indeed the evidence showed, and the 
Commissioner found, that South Ogden, a city of 7,500 
population, was already being served by three branch 
banks within its limits, and was immediately adjacent to 
Ogden with its five unit banks and two additional branch 
banks. (Finding 11, App. II, Applicant's Exhibit I, 
Pg. 57). 
Following the conclusion of the hearings before the 
Bank Commissioner and in conformity with his state-
ment that he would seek the advice of the Attorney Gen-
eral upon the legal question raised by the protesting 
banks, the Commissioner submitted to the Attorney Gen-
eral the following question: 
"Should the Commissioner of Utah Financial In-
stitutions find that the public convenience and 
advantage would not be subverted, may a branch 
bank be lawfully established within the corporate 
limits of South Ogden, Utah, a city of the second 
class in which no unit bank is located, but which 
is immediately adjacent to Ogden, Utah, another 
city of the second class in which are presently 
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located five unit banks, where it is shown by the 
evidence that the primary objective of the branch 
bank is not to serve South Ogden, Utah, in which 
it is physically to be located, but rather to serve 
Ogden, Utah?" (Emphasis added). 
The written opinion of the Attorney General <Phil 
L. Hansen) in response to such question was released 
under date of August 15, 1968, and on September 9. 
1968, the Bank Commissioner issued his decision in writ-
ing denying plaintiff's application for the branch. The 
opinion of the Attorney General was referred to in the 
decision as the basis for the decision, and was appended 
to the decision. (App. VO. 
Thereafter, plaintiff brought this action in the lower 
court for a "review" of the decision as provided under 
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953. After issue was joined by 
all parties, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which 
motion was granted and summary judgment entered on 
March 20, 1969, in favor of plaintiff and against defend-
ants. (R. 67). By such judgment (which is set out in 
full at page IX of the Appendix hereto) the lower court 
decreed ( 1) that the decision of the Bank Commissioner 
was unlawful and was set aside, and (2) that the Bank 
Commissioner is ordered and directed to grant the appli-
cation of plaintiff for the South Ogden branch. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION 
REPRESENTS SOUND LAW, AND THE 
BANK COMMISSIONER'S DECISION, BEING 






At the outset, we point out that Section 7-1-26, 
U.C.A. 1953, \vhich vests the lmver court with the power 
to "review" decisions of the Bank Commissioner, limits 
the power of the court as follows: 
"The reviewing court shall have power to hold 
unlawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling 
of the bank commissioner found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not 
in accordance with law." 
Thus the power of the lower court is limited to setting 
aside a decision of the bank commissioner found to be not 
in accordance with law. 
It is unfortunate that the judgment of the lower 
court with which we are here concerned, while determin-
ing that the decision of the Bank Commissioner was "not 
in accordance with law", does not specify how, or by vir-
tue of what circumstance, such decision was contrary to 
law. However, since the only contention of the plaintiff 
in the lovvert court was that the Bank Commissioner's 
decision was wrong because it was based upon the Attor-
ney General's opinion, which opinion plaintiff claimed 
was not legally sound, we assume that the decision of 
the lower court is based upon this same reasoning. We, 
accordingly, present as our first point of argument our 
contention that the Attorney General's opinion repre-
sents sound law. To do this we first consider the appli-
cable statutes pertaining to branch banking. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides 
as follows: 
"The business of every bank shall be conducted 
only at its banking house and every bank shall 
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receive deposits and pay checks only at its bank-
ing house except as hcreinaf ter provided. 
"With the consent of the bank commissioner any 
bank having a paid-in capital and surplus of not 
less than $60,000 may establish and operate one 
branch for the transaction of its business; pro-
vided, that for each additional branch established 
there shall be paid in an additional $60,000 (cap-
ital and surplus). 
"All banking houses and branches shall be located 
either within the corporate limits of a city or town, 
or within unincorporated areas of a county in 
which a city of the first class is located. 
"Except in cities of the first class, or within unin-
corporated areas of a county in which a city of the 
first class is located, no branch bank shall be estab-
lished in any city or town in which is located a 
bank or banks, state or national, regularly trans-
acting a customary banking business, unless the 
bank seeking to establish such branch shall take 
over an existing bank. No unit bank organized 
and operating at a point where there are other 
operating banks, state or national, shall be per-
mitted to be acquired by another bank for the 
purpose of establishing a branch until such bank 
shall have been in operation as such for a period 
of five years. 
"The term 'branch' as used in this act shall be 
held to include any branch bank, branch office, 
branch agency, additional office, or any branch 
place of business at which deposits are received 
or checks paid or money lent. 
"Any bank desiring to establish one or more 
branches or offices shall file a written application 
therefor in such form and containing such infor-
mation as the bank commissioner may reasonably 




any branch or office until it shall first have been 
shown to the satisfaction of the bank commis-
sioner that the public convenience and advantage 
will he subserved and promoted by the establish-
ment of such branch or office. The bank commis-
sioner may, at his discretion, hold a public hear-
ing on any application to establish a branch. He 
shall give notice of such hearing by publication in 
three successive issues in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the County in which the branch is 
to be established. The decision of the bank com-
missioner granting or denying an application to 
establish a branch shall be in writing, stating the 
reasons therefore, and shall be mailed to the ap-
plicant and all protestants. The bank commis-
sioner may by order permitting the establishment 
of such branch or office designate and limit the 
character of work and service which may therein 
be performed. 
"No branch shall be established at a location out-
side the corporate limits of a city or town in such 
close proximity to an established bank or branch 
as to unreasonably interfere with the business 
thereof. 
"Any corporation or officer thereof violating any 
of the provisions of this section is guilty of a mis-
demeanor." Utalics reflect the provisions which 
\Ve deem particularly applicable to the question at 
hand.) 
Section 7-3-6.3, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, pro-
vides as follows: 
"From and after the effective date of this act no 
unit bank and no branch bank shall be established 
or authorized to conduct a banking business ex-




In the case of Walker Banh & Trus[ Company vs. 
Taylor, 15 Utah (2) 234, 390 P. (2) 592, this court made 
the following observation with respect to the prohibiti\'c 
effect of the foregoing statutes, and their legislative his-
tory: 
"We arc of the opinion that our statute is restric-
tive and, what it does not expressly permit, it pro-
hibits. There is but one method of establishing a 
branch bank in a city of less than the first class 
having an existing unit bank and that is by 'tak-
ing over' such bank. The legislative history of 
branch banking is of great significance. In 1911, 
the legislature enacted a statute which absolutely 
prohibited branch banking. It was not until 1933 
that the legislature relaxed this prohibition and 
permitted branching under certain conditions and 
circumstances. During the period between 191 J 
and 1933 the legislature evidently was of the 
opinion that branch banking was not in the puh-
lic interest, possibly because it might impair the 
stability of the existing banks. This reasoning 
could well have infl,uenced the law makers when 
they saw fit to allow branch banking, but only 
under certain restrictive conditions. The legisla-
tive history lends support to the proposition that 
what our branch banking laws do not permit they 
prohibit." <Italics added.) 
EFFECT AND OBJECTIVE OF STATUTES 
By the foregoing statutes the legislature has affirma-
tively declared that only certain specified geographical 
areas are open to the establishment of branch banks, other 
than by the so-called "take over" method with \Yhich \\"C 
are not here concerned. With the exception of Salt Lake 
County and Salt Lake City, as to which the lcgisbture 
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has established different rules not applicable here, the 
geographical areas not automatically closed to branch-
ing are municipalities in which there are no unit banks. 
Or to state it in the negative, all unincorporated areas of 
the counties, and all municipalities in which are presently 
located a unit bank or banks, are closed to the establish-
ment of branch banks. The Legislature has further 
affirmatively declared it to be the policy of Utah that as 
the public comprising the closed municipalities require 
additional bank facilities, such additional needs are to be 
provided through the establishment of new unit banks, 
and not by means of branching. Thus the legislative pol-
icy of Utah, as reflected in the foregoing statutory restric-
tions on branch banking, is one of encouraging the unit 
banking system and discouraging branch banking. This 
policy, as pointed out by the Attorney General in his 
opinion, serves a dual purpose, in that it is designed to 
protect existing unit banks from the competition of out-
of-city banks through the branching process, and to pro-
mote the furnishing of additional banking competition 
through the establishment of local unit banks. The rea-
soning behind such policy is as suggested by this Court 
in Walker Bank & Trust Co. vs. Taylor, supra, namely, 
that unlimited branch banking 
"was not in the public interest, possibly because 
it might impair the stability of the existing banks." 
PLAINTIFF WALKER BANK'S APPLICATION 
Ogden City, a city of the second class, has five unit 
banks established and located within its corporate limits. 
Thus Ogden City is closed to de novo branching. Plain-
tiff sought permission to establish a branch in South 
Ogden, a city of the third class which adjoins Ogden on 
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the south, and which presently has thre2 branch banks 
located and established within its corporate limits, but no 
unit bank or banks. Thus South Ogden is not closed to 
the establishment of the proposed branch if it is demon-
strated to the satisfaction of the Bank Commissioner that 
the needs and convenience of South Ogden require acldi-
tional banking facilities. However. that is not this case, 
and it does not involve the question upon which the 
Attorney General's opinion was based, as plaintiff's e\'i-
dence by plaintiff's own admission was not directed to-
ward the needs and convenience of South Ogden. 
Thus, the legal question involved became one of 
whether the law permitted Walker Bank to establish :i 
branch in South Ogden, based not upon the needs and 
requirements of South Ogden, or with the primary ob-
jective of serving South Ogden, but rather upon the basis 
of a claimed need for additional banking services in Og-
den and other closed areas in Weber and North 
County, and with the primary objective of serving and 
fulfilling those asserted needs. 
This was the legal question submitted by the Com-
missioner to the Attorney General, and in response to 
which the Attorney General ruled that Utah law does 
not permit the establishment of the proposed branch 
under such circumstances. 
We concur in such opinion, and submit that any 
other view must literally result in the destruction of the 
Utah legislative policy designed to protect unit banks 
from the competition of de novo branches. Ogden City 
provide1s a prime example, as it is adjoined on the north 
by North Ogden, and on the south by South Ogden, 
-with branch banks in both, but no unit banks in either. 
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A view contrary to the Attorney General's ruling would 
permit Ogden to be surrounded by branch banks located 
adjacent to it but in the adjoining incorporated areas, and 
justified only on their ability to serve Ogden City where 
they are prohibited from branching. Such a subversion 
of the legislative restrictions on branch banking must be 
of necessity unlawful. 
Plaintiff's entire case in the lower court rested upon 
its contention that where what it referred to as the "sta-
tutory requirements" are found to exist, then the appli-
cant has the right to establish the branch as a matter of 
law. The statutory requirements, or criteria, claimed by 
plDintiff to gi\·e rise to this right are (I) adequate capital 
and surplus, (2) that the branch be located in a munici-
pality in which there is no unit bank, and (3) that pub-
lic convenience and advantage would be served by its 
establishment. This, likewise, must have been the con-
clusion of the lower court in the light of its judgment 
that the decision of the Bank Commissioner was "not in 
accordance with law'', and in ordering the Bank Com-
missioner as a matter of law to grant the application. 
On the other hand, the defendants contend, and this 
is the thrust of the Attorney General's opinion, that the 
exi<;tence of these criteria do not give rise to a right to 
establish a branch, but rather that they are factors that 
must exist as conditions precedent to the approval of a 
branch. In other words, if any of the criteria do not 
exist, the statute itself closes the door to the proposed 
branch. On the other hand, where the criteria are shown 
to exist, the discretionary approval by the Bank Commis-
sioner is still required. This discretionary approval by 
the Bank Commissioner is in a sense a fourth criteria. 
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This is obvious from even a casual reading of the statute 
(Section 7 -3-6). With respect to capital it provides: 
"With the consent of the bank commissioner any 
bank having a paid in capital and surplus of not 
less than $60,000 may establish and operate one 
branch for the transaction of its business; provided 
that for each additional branch established there 
shall be paid in an additional $60,000 capital and 
surplus." <Emphasis added.) 
Thus the key words there are "With the consent of 
the bank commissioner". 
With respect to location, the statute provides: 
" ... no branch shall be established in any city or 
town in which is located a bank or banks ... '' 
The significance here is the negative approach. No 
branch may be established in a municipality where there 
is a unit bank. Nowhere does the statute provide, other 
than with the consent of the Bank Commissioner, that 
branches shall be permitted in municipalities in which 
there are no unit banks. 
And finally the statute provides: 
"No bank shall be permitted to establish any 
branch or office until it shall first have been shown 
to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner that 
the public convenience and advantage will be sub-
served and promoted by the establishment of such 
branch or office." 
Here again is the prohibitive approach. Without 
convenience and advantage the branch may not be estab-
lished. Convenience and advantage is a condition prece-
dent to the bank commissioner's approval, but its mere 
existence does not give rise to a right to such approval. 
Obviously where the initial three criteria are shown to 
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exist the bank comm1ss1oner may not arbitrarily with-
hold his approval, but our point is, and this is the essence 
of the Attorney General's opinion, that where it is addi-
tionally shown that the primary objective of the pro-
posed location is not to serve the area where it is to be 
located, but rather to serve an adjoining area which the 
legislature has declared to be off-limits to branching, then 
the bank commissioner has not only the right, but also 
the duty to withhold his approval, and such withholding 
of approval cannot be said to be "contrary to law". 
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SCHEMES TO EVADE 
BRANCH POLICY 
The laws relating to branch banking vary from state 
to state. Some states permit unlimited branch banking. 
Others prohibit it entirely. The majority, like Utah, per-
mit it subject to limitations and restrictions, which limi-
tations and restrictions vary from state to state. 
The merits of one policy as compared to another is 
open to debate, as evidenced by unlimited branching in 
some states and complete prohibition in others. How-
ever, we are not here concerned with varying philosophies 
upon the subject, but only with applying the law as it 
exists in Utah, to the end of meeting the objectives of 
the legislature. As stated by this court in Walker Bank 
& Trust Co. vs. Taylor, supra, 
"It is acknowledged that the State has the right 
and prerogative to regulate banks and banking 
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the disposition 
of the problem must be resolved by the interpre-
tation of the applicable statutory law relating 
thereto." 
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And further in the same case: 
"We are of the opinion that our statute is restric-
tive and, what it does not expressly permit, it pro-
hibits." 
In the light of the varying philosophies as to the 
merits of liberal branching policies as compared to restric-
tive branching policies, it is not surprising that schemes 
designed to evade state branching law from time to time ! 
develop, but the Courts that have h'.d occasion to cnn-
sider such schemes invariably recognize them for wh;1t i 
they <lfC and Strike them d0\Yl1. ror c;;amplc. in one 
Marion National Bank v. Camp, April 5, I 968 ( unre-
ported, but a copy of the decision had been filed with the 
Clerk of this Court), a bank sought to "move" its prin-
cipal office approximately 12 miles to a location where ' 
it could not legally establish a branch and to retain its 
former office as a branch. The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that: 
"This Court cannot permit the legislative scheme 
to be emasculated by an arid emphasis on such 
terms as 'branch' and 'main office' without regard 
to the legislative purpose which these terms were 
really intended to express. The clear preponder-
ance of evidence in this case is that the plan which 
Van Buren Bank and the Comptroller character-
ize as a 'relocation' of the 'main office' in Marion 
coupled with a 'branch' into Van Buren is in fact 
intended as a subterfuge for what is essentially an 
attempt by an established bank in Van Buren, In-
diana, to establish a branch in Marion. 
* * * * 
... the court finds that the plan is contrary to the 
legislative policy of Indiana ... 
"' * * * 
... The plan . . was clearly intended to and docs 
circumvent the relevant Indiana statute .. 
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* * * * 
It is therefore CONSIDERED, ORDERED, DE-
CREED AND DECLARED that the proposed 
(plan) . . . is, and would be illegal and unlaw-
ful . . ,, 
Similarly, in striking down the application of a 
Michigan bank to establish a branch just across the street 
from a village but purportedly in a "new area", the U. 
S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (American 
Bank & Trust Company v. Saxon, 373 F<2> 283, <1967) 
stated: 
"It takes little imagination to be aware that the 
Dart bank moved across the street, not to serve the 
separate village, but to be immediately adjacent 
to the new Holt Shopping Center ... " 
Bank of Dearborn vs. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 294, 373 
Fed. <2> 283, involved a situation where the Comptroller 
of the Currency approved an application by Manufac-
turers National B8.nk to establish a new branch in the 
County just across the boundary from Dearborn, and in 
close proximity to an existing branch of Manufacturers' 
Nation;il Bank. Concurrently, the Comptroller approved 
an application to "move" the existing branch to a new 
location which was not open to de novo branching under 
Michigon lo.w. Protesting unit banks in Dearborn con-
tended that the two proposals taken together constituted 
a subterfuge and evasion of Michigan law, and that the 
Comptroller abused his discretion in approving them. 
In agreeing with this contention, the District Court 
said: 
"Maybe the laws should be amended to permit the 
utmost flexibility in branch banking. Maybe they 
should not. Congressional debate on this issue has 
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gone on for years. But it is not for defendant 
Saxon and defendant bank to amend our 'anti- ' 
quated' laws by clever devices of evasion, ... " 
In re Princeton Bank & Trust Company <N. ].> 208 
A. (2) 820 involved a novel scheme which the Superior 
Court of New Jersey held to be but a subterfuge designed 
to circumvent New Jersey branch banking laws. 
Princeton Bank had its principal office in the muni-
cipality of Princeton, and a branch in Princetown Town-
ship (County). It desired to establish another branch in 
the county, but was precluded by New Jersey law from 
so doing because its principal office was in Princeton 
municipality. It accordingly (and this was legal under 
New Jersey law) changed its principal location to the 
premises in the County occupied by its existing branch, 
and changed the location of its branch to the premises 
formerly occupied by the main office. It was then free to 
seek the additional branch, which it did. First National 
Bank of Princeton appealed from the decision of the 
Commissioner of Banking granting the application. We 
quote from the decision of the Court reversing the Com-
missioner of Banking: 
"First National's principal contentions on this ap-
peal are that ( 1) Trust Company's actions were 
merely a device to circumvent the branch bank 
limitations of the Banking Act of 1948, as 
amended (N.J.S.A. 17:9A-l et seq.) and (2) the 
Commissioner's findings that Trust Company had 
met the requirements of N.J.S.A. 17:9A-20 are not 
supported by substantial evidence and should be 
reversed." 
* * * * 
"We come, then, to the first of the two main argu-
ments projected by First National, namely, that 
20 
Trust Company's actions were a subterfuge and a 
device for circumventing our banking laws, and 
that there was not a bona fide transfer of its prin-
cipal office to Princeton Township. 
"Standing in isolation and away from the realities 
of what actually happened, the interchange of the 
principal and branch offices which Trust Com-
pany sought to effect in May 1962 would appear 
to be legally unassailable. Its executive committee 
had authorized that the principal office be changed 
from Nassau Street in Princeton Borough to the 
Princeton Shopping Center in Princeton Town-
ship, then occupied by its branch office, and that 
the Nassau Street Office thereafter be maintained 
as a branch office. The necessary certificate of 
change was filed with the Department of Banking 
and Insurance on May 28, five days later. 
<Whether the principal office was actually trans-
ferred to the shopping center will shortly be con-
sidered.) However, the interchange was but the 
first step of a plan which would enable Trust 
Company to apply to the Commissioner of Bank-
ing and insurance for a branch office at the pro-
posed new site in the northeastern section of 
Princeton Township. That application was au-
thorized to be filed with the Department of Bank-
ing and Insurance by action of the executive com-
mittee taken within the month, on June 20. 
"The sequence of events speaks eloquently of 
Trust Company's purpose. It had Mr. Cook, the 
local realtor, checking the surrounding area for a 
possible branch site for some time prior to the ac-
tions taken by the executive committee, described 
above. He negotiated for the proposed site around 
the first of 1962, and the option agreement for the 
property was executed in March. President Cosby 
had also been investigating the possibilities of the 
area. He reported to the bank's board of directors 
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regarding 'recent developments' on April 11, 1962., 
at which time the board authorized its executive 
committee to resolve the matter of the bank's new 
quarters as quickly as possible. Then came the 
executive committee's resolution of May 23, 1962, 
authorizing the change of the principal office from 
the borough to the shopping center in the town-
ship, followed soon after by its resolution author-
izing the filing of an application with the Com-
missioner for approval of the new branch office in 
the northeastern section of the township. 
"We need not base our conclusion that \\'hat Tru<,t 
Company did was a device to circumvent the pro-
visions of N.J.S.A. 17:9A-19 on this factual se-
quence alone. President Cosby, in his testimony 
at the Department hearings, candidly admitted 
the true purpose of the change. In the course of 
his cross-examination he said: 
'I knew that under New Jersey law we could 
not establish a second branch in the trrn n-
ship without the prior step of moving the 
principal office into the township'." 
"' "' * "' 
"What Trust Company could not do directly, it 
sought to do indirectly. The Banking Act, and 
particularly N.J .S.A. 17 :9A-23, the interchange 
provisions, cannot be used to that end." 
* * * * 
"The determination of the Commissioner of Bank-
ing and Insurance is accordingly reversed." 
The case of Dickinson vs. First National Bank in 
Plant City <Sth Cir. Sept. I 2, I 968,J 400 Fed. <2J 548, 
involved an off-premises night depository and an 8rmored 
car pick-up and delivery service, 8nd the question of 
whether the same constituted an illegal branch operation 
under Federal and state law. In concluding the operation 
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constituted illegal branching, the court commented upon 
the defendant's contrary arguments as follows: 
"The above analysis by Judge Lindberg represents 
an accurate and perceptive application of our 
statement of policy in Jackson, and we subscribe 
to it without hesitation. We do so on two impor-
tant grounds. 
"First, we cannot aid and abet First National's 
attempt to evade the wishes of Congress by an 
adroit manipulation of statutory language. Sec-
ond, we will not choose to overlook state law in 
penumbral areas when the thrust of the National 
Banking Act is 'competitive equality' between na-
tional and state branching authority. 
"Congress is in the defining business and is knowl-
edgeable as to how to immunize or deimmunize an 
activity from its statutory engulfment. In Section 
36 ( f) Congress provided only that the term 
'branch' 'shall be held to include' these offices 
which engage in the receipt of deposits, the pay-
ing of checks, or the lending of money. Such a 
provision is hardly adequate as a definition be-
cause it merely sets out in general terms what 
everyone knows to be the life-blood functions of 
banking. If we construed Section 36 <f> as per-
mitting paper evasions from state anti-branching 
laws, we would be letting the left hand give and 
the right hand take away. Statutory construction 
has not fallen to such legalistic depths. We repeat 
the words of Judge Gewin, speaking for our Court 
en bane, in Miller vs. Amusement Enterprises Inc., 
5 Cir. 1968, 394 F.2d, 342,353: 
'We are not only dealing with the language 
of the statute, but we must look as well to the 
logic of Congress and the broad national pol-
icy which was evidenced by its enactment. 
Our system does not favor mechanical juris-
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prudence; it seeks to find the purpose and 
spirit of a statute and the intention of its 
makers. Holy Trinity Church vs. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457,459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L. 
Ed. 226,228; National Woodwork Manufac-
turers Asso. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 87 S. Ct. 
1250, 18 L. Ed. 2d 357, 364'." <Italics added.) 
We acknowledge that the foregoing cases arc in 
many respects factually dissimilar from the one nrnv 
under cor:3ideration. However, they are similar one with 
the other, and with this case, in that each involves a plan 
to evade legislative limitations imposed upon branch 
banking. In recognizing these schemes for what they ;ire, 
namely, unlawful attempts to evade and frustrate legis-
lative policy restricting branch banking the Courts have 
uniformly and without equivocation characterized them 
as such, and nullified them. 
We are not unmindful of the fact that cases can be 
found in which as a result of appropriate planning, 
branching restrictions have been avoided. Two such cases 
which plaintiff relied upon in the Court below, and 
which we assume it will cite to this Court, are First Na-
tional Bank of Canton vs. Canton Exchange Bank (Miss.) 
1963, 156 So. (2) 580, and Application of Howard Sav-
ings Institution of Newark <N.J. 1959> 159 Atl. <2J 
I I 3. We briefly discuss these two cases at this point. 
In the Canton case, Mississippi law permitted Can-
ton Exchange Bank to establish a branch office (which is 
different from a branch bank under Mississippi law) in 
the County of Madison, outside the town of RidgebiJ, 
but not within the corporate limits of Ridgeland. Never-
theless, it established an office in Ridgeland, but when it 
discovered its location there was unlawful, it moved the 
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office outside the corporate limits and into the County. 
This move was approved by the State Comptroller. First 
National Bank of Canton sought to enjoin the operation 
at the new location, and claimed that the move outside 
the corporate limits of Ridgeland was but a maneuver to 
circumvent Mississippi law. The Court upheld Canton 
Exchange Bank, ruling that approval of the new location 
was within the discretion of the Comptroller. We do not 
quarrel with the decision, and point out that the neces-
sary ingredient for a contrary decision was there missing. 
That ingredient was the determination by the Comptrol-
ler or the Court that the move was motivated by the ob-
jective of evading and circumventing legislative policy. 
Had that determination been made, as it was here the 
basis of the Attorney General's opinion, we have no doubt 
but that the Mississippi Court, like other courts we have 
referred to above, would have refused to give its approvd. 
The Howard case was concerned with a statute far 
diITerent from ours. The New Jersey statute provides that 
the Commissioner shall approve a branch application if 
he determines that the public convenience would be 
served, and the proposed operation has reasonable prom-
ise of successful operation. Thus, in New Jersey, after 
these criteria have been found, it is not only a matter of 
legislative policy, but the statute expressly declares, that 
the branch be granted. No contention was urged, and no 
determination was made that the application was moti-
vated by improper objectives. All that was involved was 
whether the Commissioner abused his discretion in find-
ing the essential criteria existed. 
Further than that, and at the other end of the spec-
trum, is the case of In re Princeton Bank, cited by us 
supra, wherein the same New Jersey court in a later deci-
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sion, and upon a finding that what the bank did was a 
device designed to circumvent the law, ref used to sanc-
tion the attempt. 
We submit, accordingly, that the opm1on of the 
Attorney General reflects sound principles of la\v in the 
light of st::i.tutory limitations upon the establishment of 
branch banks. The thrust of his opinion, as previously 
noted, is that the legislature has effectively closed certain 
geographic areas to the establishment of de novo branch 
banks. That these closed areas include, insofar as Davis 
and Weber Counties are concerned, the unincorporated 
portions of those counties, plus the municipalities in 
which there is already located a unit bank. That the leg-
islature has affirmatively declared a method whereby the 
banking needs of these closed areas is to be met, namely, 
through the establishment of new unit banks, -not by 
branching. That legislative policy, as reflected in these 
statutory limitations, is designed to protect existing unit 
banks from the competition of branch banks, and to en-
courage the establishment of new unit banks to meet 
growing banking needs, and that this legislative policy 
is not to be frustrated by the establishment of branch 
banks immediately adjacent to closed areas for the pri-
mary purpose of serving these closed areas and compet-
ing with existing unit banks therein. 
Who can say that these conclusions so reached by 
the Attorney General are not sound legally? Or that the 
Bank Commissioner in following and applying them in 
the discharge of the duties of his office acted unlawfully 
and contrary to law? 
Who can so say? The lower court so said, and that 
is why we are here. For if a branch bank may lawfully 
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be established, not for the purpose of serving the needs 
of the community in which it locates, but for the primary 
purpose and with the primary objective of serving an 
adjacent area which the legislature has declared closed 
to the establishment of branch banks, then the legislative 
limitations on branch banking have been effectively frus-
trated and negated, as there is not a "closed" area in the 
state that would not be subject to effective invasion by 
branch banks. To what end has the legislature declared 
Ogden City (and many other geographic areas) off limits 
to the establishment of de novo branch banks, if branch 
hanking can lawfully be conducted therein by the physi-
cal location of branch banks outside the limits of the for-
bidden areas, but immediately adjacent thereto? 
We are not, of course, discussing the situation where 
a lawfully established branch bank incidentally serves 
customers living in other areas, which we acknowledge 
as being entirely lawful. What we are dealing with is a 
situation where a branch bank proposes to locate in an 
area not closed to branching, not for the primary pur-
pose of serving that area, and but incidentally serving 
customers living or doing business elsewhere, but for the 
primary purpose and with the primary objective of serv-
ing an adjacent area which the legislature has declared 
closed to branching. It is this purpose and objective 
which, under the Attorney General's opinion, renders un-
lawful the establishment of the branch in question. 
We submit that the legal conclusions so reached by 
the Attorney General are sound, and that the Bank Com-
missioner in adopting them as the basis for his decision 
acted in accordance with law. 
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II. 
THE DECISION OF THE BANK COMMISSIONER 
WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW FOR REASONS 
UNAFFECTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 
OPINION 
As we briefly noted under Point I of our argument, 
it was plaintiff's contention in the lower court (and con-
currence therein is of necessity the basis for the lower 
court's decision), that the statute lays down but three cri-
teria, or "requirements" for the granting of a branch, 
i.e., (I) the required capital, (2) public convenience and 
advantage, and (3) its location in a municipality in which 
there is then no unit bank or banks. Therefore, argued 
the plaintiff, and so ruled the Court, since the Commis-
sioner's Findings favorably covered these items, the plain-
tiff was entitled to the branch as a matter of law, and this 
notwithstanding that the evidence disclosed that the 
South Ogden location was sought, not for the purpose 
of serving the needs and convenience of South Ogden, but 
for the purpose of serving other geographic portions of 
the Ogden Metropolitan Area which the legislature had 
closed to branching. 
On the other hand, the conclusion reached by the 
Attorney General was that where the true purpose and 
object of the applicant was not to serve the needs and con-
venience of the municipality in which it sought to lo-
cate, but to serve adjacent areas which the legislature has 
closed to branching, then the application must be denied 
as a matter of law. 
These are the two extremes. The plaintiff con-
tended, and the lower court ruled, that plaintiff was en-
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titled to the branch as a matter of law. The Attorney 
General ruled that the application must be denied as a 
matter of law. The defendants concur in the conclu-
sions of the Attorney General, but also urge that the 
e:..trcme position of the Attorney General need not neces-
sarily be accepted as the basis for the ultimate decision 
in this case. This by reason of the fact that it is not the 
opinion of the Attorney General that is here under re-
vie\\·, but rather the question of whether the decision of 
the Bank Commissioner in denying plaintiff's application 
for a South Ogden branch was a lawful decision. If the 
Court accepts the ruling of the Attorney General as 
sound, the denial of the application by the Bank Com-
·was obviously "in accordance with law", and 
that is the end of this case. But on the other hand, if 
the conclusion of the Attorney General is not accepted, 
then the decision of the Bank Commissioner can be said 
to be "not in accordance with law" only if this Court 
accepts plaintiff's thesis that once the three statutory 
criteria are shown to exist the applicant is entitled to its 
branch as a matter of law. This simply cannot be if the 
statute is to be given any effect whatever. 
As we further noted under Point I, the statute vests 
the Commissioner with a broad discretion in granting or 
denying branches, subject, of course, to legislative limi-
tations and restrictions embodied in the three criteria. 
When the evidence is such as to support a finding that 
these three conditions of proper capital, public conven-
ience, and no existing unit bank have been met, the law 
does not require that the Commissioner's discretion be 
directed in but the single channel of approval, as that 
would negate any exercise of discretion. Many reasons 
may exist why the Commissioner in the exercise of his 
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discretion may and should deny the branch. Without 
attempting to be all inclusive, we suggest several sound 
reasons why the Commissioner in any given case may 
properly and lawfully deny an application for a branch, 
even after he has determined that the applicant has O) 
proper capital, (2) that public need and convenience 
would be served and ( 3) there is no existing unit bank 
in the municipality in which the branch is to be located. 
For example, the Commissioner may determine that 
the plan of operation of the proposed branch is not in 
accord with sound banking practice. Or that the branch 
will be understaffed. Or that the individuals proposed 
to manage the branch are not sufficiently experienced. 
Or that the interests and the needs and convenience of 
the area would be better served through the establishment 
of a new unit bank, instead of the branch. Or that an-
other location would be more suitable. Or that, as in the 
instant case, that the applicant was not really interested 
in the South Ogden location as such, or in serving South 
Ogden, but rather sought the branch for the primary 
purpose of serving Ogden, Clearfield, Layton, Kaysville, 
and other portions of Weber and North Davis Counties 
in which the legislature had denied it the legal right to 
locate. Each of these examples provide sound reasons 
why, in any given case, a branch application may prop-
erly be denied from a purely discretionary standpoint, 
notwithstanding the existence of the three criteria above 
mentioned. 
Thus, the essence of this point of our argument is 
that it is the decision of the Bank Commissioner in deny-
ing the branch that is under review, and not the validity 
of the Attorney General's opinion. Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 
1953, vests the reviewing court with power to set aside a 
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decision of the Bank Commissioner which the Court de-
termines to be "not in accordance with law". The lower 
court, in entering its judgment herein setting aside the 
decision of the Bank Commissioner for the reason that 
the decision was "not in accordance with law", and in 
directing the Commissioner to issue a new decision grant-
ing the application, can be supported only upon the pre-
mise that a decision approving the application was the 
only decision the Commissioner could lawfully make. 
This cannot be, as such reasoning effectively deprives the 
Commissioner in all cases of any discretion in the mat-
ter of approving branch banks. 
The cmclusion of the Attorney General may be 
deemed to be entirely wrong, yet the decision of the Bank 
Commissioner, i.e., the denial of the application, be en-
tirely rigbt, proper and lawful. The decision of the Bank 
Commissioner does not stand or fall upon the accepta-
bility of the Attorney General's opinion, but upon the 
question of whether it \Vas, in its final analysis, a deci-
sion which he could lawfully make. 
W c submit, accordingly, that the denial of the ap-
plication was a decision that the Bank Commissioner 
muld Ia,d ully make, and this irrespective of the accepta-
bility of the opinion of the Attorney General. Since it 
was a decision he could lawfully make, the lower court 
erred in setting it aside on the grounds that it was con-
trary to law. 
III. 
TI IE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT, AS 11-IERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACTS LEFT UNRESOLVED 
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Plaintiff, by its complaint in the lower court, sought 
a declaratory judgment that the decision of the Bank 
Commissioner be declared erroneous and not in accord-
ance with law, that such decision be set aside, that its 
application for the branch in South Ogden should have 
been granted, and that the court direct the Bank Com-
missioner to grant the application forthwith. <R U. 
The complaint, and the ruling sought thereby, was pred-
icated upon the narrow ground that, 
"8. Said opinion (Attorney General's) and the 
decision of the defendant <Brimhall) which 
adopted said opinion is erroneous as a matter of 
law in that the branch banking statutes permit a 
branch bank to be located in any city or town in 
which a unit bank is not located." <Par. 8 of Com-
plaint, R. 3). 
The answer of the Bank Commissioner denied gen-
erally the alleged unlawfulness of his decision, and de-
nied particularly the allegations of Paragraph 8, supra. 
(R. 14.) 
The answer of the defendant banks denied generally 
the allegations of said Paragraph 8, denied the alleged 
unlawfulness of the Bank Commissioner's decision, and 
additionally raised the defenses, 
I) that the finding of the Bank Commissioner 
that the public convenience and advantage 
would be promoted and subserved by the es-
tablishment of the proposed branch was arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and 
not in accordance with law, in that it was 
wholly without support in the evidence, and, 
2) that the Bank Commissioner failed to find that 
the public convenience and advantage of that 
portion of the public comprising South Ogden 
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would be in any way promoted or subserved 
by the establishment of the proposed branch 
(R. 19, 20)' 
Thus the answers collectively raised the defenses of 
( 1) the lawfulness of the decision from an over-all stand-
point, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
Commissioner's general finding of public convenience 
and advantage as compared to a finding of public con-
venience and advantage specifically related to the muni-
cipality in which the branch is to be located. All of these 
defenses obviously relate to the lawfulness of the decision 
under attack, and the latter two particularly for the rea-
son that if either is valid there is then an absence of one 
of the three criteria even plaintiff acknowledges to be 
essential to support an approval of the application-in 
which event the Commissioner's decision denying the 
application was the only decision that lawfully could be 
made. 
Following the filing of the answer of defendant 
banks, the plaintiff moved to strike therefrom the defense 
that the general finding of the Bank Commissioner on 
the question of public convenience and advantage was 
not supported by the evidence, and as ground of its mo-
tion asserted, 
"that the quoted portion of said answer is an im-
proper and insufficient defense and immaterial to 
the determination of the above entitled cause." 
<R. 42.) 
Plaintiff's argument to the lower court in support of 
its motion to strike was to the effect that plaintiff had 
framed its complaint for review upon the narrow ground 
of the alleged invalidity of the Attorney General's opin-
ion; that the lawfulness of the Bank Commissioner's deci-
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sion was to be judged solely from the standpoint of that 
opinion; that the issues were restricted to the single issue 
so raised by plaintiff; and that there was and could be no 
defenses of the type pleaded by the defendant banks. 
<R. 43.) 
The lower court accepted plaintiff's views on the 
matter, granted plaintiff's motion to strike, and thus re-
moved from the case any question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the relief plaintiff itself was seeking. 
The position of the defendant banks with respect to 
this particular defense was, and now is, that it pre-
sented a defense directly related to the question of (I J 
whether the decision of the Bank Commissioner was in 
accordance with law, and (2) whether the plaintifI in 
any event was entitled to the relief it sought. Not only 
were the defendants entitled to raise this issue, but the 
court was obliged to consider and pass upon it in its deter-
mination of the ultimate question of whether the decision 
under review was a lawful decision. 
The defense of insufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port a finding of public convenience and advantage is a 
valid defense in any proceeding to procure the establish-
ment of a branch bank, but it was of particular signifi-
cance here in the light of the gamut plaintiff's evidence 
on the subject ran. Not only were the needs and conven-
ience of the Ogden Metropolitan Area (of which South 
Ogden comprises but a small fraction) to be served by 
this branch, but the whole Wasatch front would be ad-
vantaged thereby (App. Ex I, Pg. 65). Beyond that, the 
state as a whole would benefit generally (Tr. 84, 85). 
The finding of the Commissioner upon the subject is 
phrased in but the most general terms, as indeed it had 
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to be in the light of this evidence. His finding is (App. 
V). 
"The public convenience and advantage would be 
subserved and promoted by the establishment of 
such branch at the location proposed * * * ." 
What public is the subject of this finding? Certainly 
not South Ogden, as the plaintiff deemed South Ogden's 
needs irrelevant. Is it the public comprising the Ogden 
Metropolium Area? Or the Wasatch front? Or the state 
as a whole? 
It ·was the contention of the defendant banks that 
the evidence on the subject of public need and conven-
ience ,,·as so general and ephemeral as to be insufficient 
to support any relevant affirmative finding thereon. If 
the evidence was indeed insufficient, as so contended, that 
was an end to plaintiff's case, because a denial of the 
brnncli under that circumstance was the only decision 
the Commissioner could lawfully make. 
In this connection we again call attention to the fact 
that Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, which vests the lower 
court with authority to review decisions of the bank com-
missioner, vests the court with power to set aside any 
such decision only upon a determination that the deci-
sion is "not in accordance with law". How can the court 
determine whether a decision of the bank commissioner 
is unlawful unless it first permits parties affected by the 
decision to advance reasons supporting its lawfulness as 
well as its alleged unlawfulness? And equally important, 
hmv could the lower court rationally determine whether 
the plaintiff was entitled to a contrary decision, except 
as it permitted inquiry into the question of plaintiff's 
entitlement to a contrary decision? 
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There can be no doubt but that a denial of the appli-
cation was the only lawful decision the Bank Commis-
sioner could have made if, as contended by defendant 
banks, there was no evidence to support a relevant find-
ing of public convenience and advantage. The Commis-
sioner may have assigned the wrong reason as the basis 
for his decision, but nevertheless the decision was funda-
mentally and inherently lawful and right if this issue so 
raised by defendants proved true. 
Accordingly, defendants submit that the lower court 
erred in striking the defense challenging the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support a finding of public convenience 
and advantage, and thereby foreclosing the defendant 
banks of the opportunity of advancing it. This defense 
raised a genuine issue of fact upon the question of plain-
tiff's entitlement to the relief sought by it, and upon 
which the defendants were entitled to be heard. The 
lower court erred in striking such defense and in thus 
depriving defendants of this defense. 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING IN 
ITS JUDGMENT AN ORDER TO THE BANK COM-
MISSIONER THAT PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION 
FOR A SOUTH OGDEN BRANCH BE APPROVED. 
In addition to setting aside the present decision of 
the Bank Commissioner, the lower court included in its 
judgment an order to the Bank Commissioner that he 
grant the application of plaintiff for a South Ogden 
branch. Defendants contend that this portion of the 
judgment is clearly in excess of the lower court's power 
and authority. 
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, under which this action 
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was hrought, vests the court with the limited authority 
to "set aside" an existing decision of the Bank Commis-
sioner which the court determines to be not in accord-
ance with law. This is the measure and extent of its 
power. No authority is granted the court to direct the 
Commissioner as to what his new decision may be. This 
c;ise provides an excellent example of why the ultimate 
decision of whether to grant or deny this application must 
still be with the Commissioner, and not with the court, 
but subject to the court's right again to review the law-
fulness of the new decision-whatever it may be. 
Here the Commissioner denied the application as a 
matter of law, because that is what the Attorney General 
told him to do. He considered the evidence to the extent 
of making findings with respect to the three statutory 
conditions, but in the light of the Attorney General's 
opinion he was not called upon to consider the merits of 
the application from the standpoint of the discretionary 
powers vested in him. The lower court has now deter-
mined that the decision of the Commissioner is to be set 
aside because it was contrary to law, but in so holding 
the Court has only determined that the Commissioner 
was wrong in following the Attorney General's advice 
and denying the application as a matter of law. Thus, if 
the Commissioner was wrong in following the Attorney 
General's ruling, the case must go back to the Commis-
sioner for a new decision granting or denying the appli-
cation on its merits and from a factual standpoint, but 
disregarding the opinion of the Attorney General. 
What that new decision may be, must in the first 
instance be with the Commissioner. The fact that the 
present decision denying the application on the basis of 
the Attorney General's opinion is held to be contrary to 
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law doesn't mean that the new decision must grant the 
application. Many reasons may exist why the applica-
tion should yet be denied on its merits. We have already 
suggested one such reason: namely, that the objective of 
the plaintiff in seeking this branch at this location frus-
trates and defeats legislative policy in its geographical 
limitations on branching. While the lower court has held 
that this factor alone is not sufficient to justify denial of 
the branch as a matter of law, we do not understand that 
the lower court has held that this is a circumstance which 
may not be weighed by the Commissioner, along with 
others, in the exercise of his ultimate discretion. 
Let us suggest another reason why the court must 
permit the Commissioner a further look at this applica-
tion, rather than for the Court to attempt to dictate its 
disposition. 
Nearly a year has now passed since the Commis-
sioner conducted his hearings. The case then made by 
the plaintiff for the branch, considered in its most favor-
able light, was that the economy of the Ogden Metropol-
itan Area, consisting of Weber County and North Davis 
County, was such that it required additional banking 
services of the type the plaintiff would provide, and that 
the proposed South Ogden location would provide a suit-
able base for the establishment of its facility. That from 
such a location plaintiffff would draw upon the economy 
of North Davis County and the whole of Weber County, 
and such draw would make the operation of the branch 
at the South Ogden location economically feasible. This 
is the essence of the Commissioner's findings on the sub-
ject, and for the purpose of this point of our argument we 
accept them as having support in the evidence. We also 
disregard for the moment the fact that a major portion 
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of the Ogden Metropolitan Area has been declared to be 
off-limits to the location of branch banks. 
This was the factual situation a year ago, as out-
lined and testified to by plaintiff. But what is it now? 
How, if at all, has it changed? The fact is that now it's a 
whole new ball game, and the Commissioner of necessity 
must have an opportunity of re-examining it. A year ago 
the plaintiff intended to support its South Ogden branch 
by drawing upon the whole Ogden Metropolitan Area-
8.n area in which it was not presently represented. How-
ever, since the hearings a year ago, the plaintiff has filed 
with the Commissioner, and the Commissioner now has 
pending, plaintiff's application for a branch in Roy, 
which, if granted, would effectively cut off North Davis 
County and a substantial portion of Weber County from 
the arerr proposed to be served by the South Ogden 
branch, and from the area from which the South Ogden 
branch would draw for its economic support. 
Can the Ogden Metropolitan Area support two new 
branches by plaintiff, one in South Ogden and one in 
Roy? Do the needs and convenience of the public justify 
two branches? If not, which should be granted, and 
which should be denied? Or should both be granted, or 
both denied? These are the factual questions to which 
the Commissioner must give his personal attention to the 
end of discharging the duties of his office. 
We submit, accordingly, that the portion of the 
judgment of the lower court which constitutes an order 
to the Bank Commissioner to grant plaintiff's application 
for a South Ogden branch must in any event be vacated 
and set aside. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is a basic rule that statutes are to be construed to 
give effect to legislative intent and policy. The legislative 
policy of our present statutes restricting and limiting 
branch banking is clear-to protect existing unit banks 
from the competition of branch banks, and to promote 
banking competition through the establishment of new 
unit banks. The reason behind this policy was suggested 
by this court in Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, su-
pra., as being the legislative belief that unlimited branch 
banking was not in the public interest. The statutes must 
be construed to implement this policy. Thus, a scheme 
to place a branch immediately across the boundary from 
a city in which it is prohibited by law from branching, 
with the primary object of serving the prohibited area 
and thus competing with unit banks therein, must be 
declared, as the Attorney General did declare it, an un-
lawful subterfuge. It may be, as some contend, that our 
branch banking laws are old-fashioned and out-moded 
and that they should be changed. Such contentions 
should, however, be addressed to the legislature instead 
of the courts. 
The sum and substance of the Attorney General's 
opinion was simply this: 
If the Bank Commissioner concludes from the evi-
dence before him that the primary objective of plaintiff 
in seeking to establish a branch in South Ogden is not 
to serve the needs and convenience of South Ogden, but 
rather to provide a facility to serve Ogden, where it is 
prohibited by law from locating, and effectively compet-
ing in Ogden with the unit banks situate therein, then 
the establishment of the proposed branch under such cir-
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cumstances, would not be in accord with legislative pol-
icy and would be unlawful. We submit that the legal 
conclusion so reached by the Attorney General is sound, 
and that the Bank Commissioner in adopting it as the 
basis of his decision in this case did not act contrary to 
lc:nv. 
While defending the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral and its soundness, we carry the argument a 
step furthci to meet the exigencies of the present case--
for the ultimate question before the Court is not whether 
the conclusions so reached by the Attorney General are 
sound, but whether the decision of the Commissioner was 
in accordance with law. If the opinion of the Attorney 
General is rnund, then obviously the decision of the Bank 
Commissioner is in accordance with law, and that is an 
end of the matter. On the other hand, if the Court deter-
mines that the opinion of the Attorney General is not 
sound, there still remains the ultimate question to be 
decided-Was the decision of the Bank Commissioner in 
accordance with law? We say it was, because even if the 
objective and intent of the plaintiff to frustrate the law 
does not provide a basis for denying the application as a 
matter of law, it is nevertheless a factual circumstance to 
he considered from the standpoint of the Commissioner's 
broad discretionary powers, and provides adequate sup-
port for the Commissioner's denial of the application. 
We submit, accordingly, that the opinion of the 
Attorney General is legally sound, but whether it is sound 
or not, the act of the Bank Commissioner in denying the 
applicant was a lawful act and not subject to being set 
aside by the court as being "not in accordance with law." 
Two additional grounds are presented for setting 
41 
aside the judgment of the lower court, ( 1) that the lower 
court erred in granting summary judgment, as there were 
genuine issues of fact to be decided, and (2) the lower 
court was in error in ordering the Bank Commissioner to 
grant plaintiff's application, as such an order was in ex-
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APPENDIX 
STATE OF UTAH 
Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
Salt Lake City 
In the Matter of the Application of 
WJlkcr Bank & Trust Company for 
Permission to Establish a Branch 
Bank in the vicinity of 36th Street 
and Washington Boulevard, 
South Ogden, Weber County, Utah 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
ORDER 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. That on March 21, 1968, Walker Bank & Trust Company, 175 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, filed with the Com-
missioner of Financial Institutions its application for permis-
sion to establish a branch bank in the vicinity of 36th Street 
and Washington Boulevard, South Ogden, Weber County, 
Utah, using a branch bank application form prescribed by the 
Commissioner. 
2. That the Commissioner had notice of the above application 
mailed to all banks in Weber County and others, and he had 
notice of the application published in three successive issues 
of the Ogden Standard-Examiner, beginning March 29, 1968. 
3. That written protests to the granting of this application were 
received from the Commercial Security Bank, the Bank of Ben 
Lomond, the Bank of Utah, the North Davis Bank, the First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and the Clearfield State Bank. 
4. That the Commissioner called a public hearing for considera-
tion of this application to be held in Room 313, State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, at 10:00 A.M. on the 29th day of April, 
1968. He had notice of the hearing mailed to all unit banks 
from Salt Lake County to the north end of the State and pub-
lished notice of it in three successive issues of the Ogden Stand-
ard-Examiner, beginning April 23, 1968. The hearing was 
held as noticed and was continued on April 30 and on motion 
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of the protestants, it was continued to May 13, 1968, on which 
date it was concluded. 
5. That Counsel representing applicant Walker Bank & Trust 
Company at the hearing was Mr. H. R. Waldo, Jr. Counsel 
representing protestants at the hearing were: Neil R. Olm-
stead for Commercial Security Bank, David S. Kunz for Bank 
of Utah, Max D. Lamph for Citizens National Bank, Raymond 
W. Gee for Clearfield State Bank, and Don B. Allen for First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. Others who had filed written 
protests to the application were not represented at the hearing. 
6. That written briefs were filed with the Commissioner by attor-
neys for both the applicant and the protestants. 
7. That Walker Bank & Trust Company is one of the oldest and 
largest state chartered banks in the State of Utah. Its main 
office is in Salt Lake City and it has twelve branches in Salt 
Lake County (eleven of which are presently operating) and 
branches in Price, Provo and Logan which are presently oper-
ating. 
8. That Sou th Ogden City is a city of the third class and there 
are no banks (as distinguished from branches of banks) located 
within the city limits of said City. There is no city of the first 
class in Weber County. 
9. That applicant bank has capital and surplus of not less than 
$60,000 for each branch it is presently operating and an addi-
tional $60,000 of such capital and surplus for the proposed 
branch (Exhibit 12). 
10. That the proposed branch would be located on a parcel of land 
fronting on Washington Boulevard near the corner of 36th 
Street and such parcel of land is entirely within the city limits 
of South Ogden City, Weber County, Utah. 
11. That there are within the city limits of South Ogden City a 
branch of the Bank of Utah, a branch of Commercial Security 
Bank and a branch of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. Other 
banks and branches in the Ogden Metropolitan Area, the dates 
such banks or branches were organized or established and the 
distance of such banking facilities from the proposed branch of 
App. II 
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applicant are as shown on Page 57 of Exhibit I, Table 111-3. 
All of such banks and branches (excepting only the proposed 
Bank of Northern Utah and the Syracuse Branch of The First 
National Bank of Layton, neither of which banking facilities 
are operating) have operated from the locations indicated a 
sufficient period of time to have an established business at such 
locations and all of such banks and all of the banks operating 
such branches are financially stable and secure institutions. 
Existing banks have been able to compete successfully with 
other financial institutions, (Tr. 306-309) and new banks have 
in recent years been able to enter the area, become established 
and increase their loans and resources without preventing the 
other banks from increasing their loans and resources also 
(Exhibit I, Chapter III, pp. 51-64; Tr. 65-73, 230-234, 315-
317, 349-350). 
12. That the proposed branch would supply the full range of bank-
ing services offered by the applicant bank in its other banking 
offices including drive-in tellers windows, safe-deposit boxes, 
checking and savings accounts, the Walker Bankard (a bank 
credit card service) and access to the trust department opera-
tions of the applicant bank (Tr. 204). In addition, the appli-
cant bank, being essentially a statewide bank, would offer serv-
ices to its customers in facilitating inter-branch and between-
city banking transactions (Tr. 158). 
13. That the applicant bank has a lending limit to any one person 
or corporation of approximately $2,800,000 (Tr. 204). In the 
Ogden Metropolitan Area only First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., has a larger lending limit and the other banks in the 
area have limits of $800,000 or less (Tr. 81). The ratio of 
banking h.cilities to population indicates that there are fewer 
banking facilities in the Ogden Metropolitan Area to serve the 
population than in the State as a whole (Exhibit I, p. 56; Tr. 
67, 108-113). 
14. That applicant bank has a number of existing customers having 
offices or places of business in or serving the Ogden Metropol-
itan Area. (Tr. 150-162, 210, Ex. 7). 
15. That the financial condition and history of the applicant bank, 
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and the management demonstrate its capacity to successfullv 
manage and operate the proposed branch. · 
16. That applicant contends the economic effect of the proposed 
branch and its sources of business would include all of the 
South Ogden City, Ogden City and other cities and towns and 
unincorporated areas of Weber County and of North Davis 
County (which area is referred to for convenience as the Ogden 
Metropolitan Area) (Tr. 33, 68, 96-97, 118-119, 137-138 236 
344-345). The Ogden Metropolitan Area is for many 
a single economic and trade area with Ogden as its major city. 
This Area has experienced a substantial growth in recent years 
as measured by wages, employment, income and assessPd val-
uation (Ex. 1, pp. 7-50, Ex. 2, 3, 4, and 5; Tr. 34-62, 89-92, 
113, 318-331, 349). Population has increased su bstan ti ally 
(Ex. 1, pp. 11-12, 15-17, 38-44; Tr. 40-42, 44-45, 54-58) and 
estimates of future population for the Area indicate a substan-
tial growth, with particular growth in the southeast and south-
west portions of Weber County (Ex. 1, pp. 23-30; Tr. 21-26, 
252-256). Growth of the economy in the future is likely to 
continue (Ex. 1, p. 13, 46; Tr. 74). 
17. That protestants contend that establishment of the proposed 
branch bank would circumvent the branch banking law of the 
State, because the primary objective of applicant in seeking 
this location is not to serve the needs and convenience of South 
Ogden, but rather to provide a facility that will compete 'With 
the banks in Ogden City. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I. Due notice of the receipt of this application has been given as 
required by law and a hearing was held as permitted by law. 
2. The applicant bank has the necessary capital and surplus to 
permit the establishment of an additional branch bank. 
3. The Commissioner finds that, because of the substantial eco-
nomic growth in the Ogden Metropolitan Area in recent years, 
increased competition from the proposed branch bank would 
not unreasonably interfere with the operation of the existing 
banks and branches which are located in this area. It would 
App. IV 
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not jeopardize the depositors of such banks, would not inter-
fere with the ability of these banks to maintain their financial 
strength and would not impair their ability to compete with 
the applicant bank and other banks. 
The vitality of this area is demonstrated by: per capita wages 
in 1967 of $2,100, when the per capita wage level for the State 
<lS a whole was $1,700, and the level of per capita wage receipts 
in the Ogden Metropolitan Area has consistently been above 
that for the State as a whole for the years 1960 through 1967. 
During this period there was a growth in population in the 
Area of 223 as against a growth in population in the State as 
a whole of 163. 
In 1%7, the Area had a population per banking office of 8,333 
people and the State as a whole had a population per banking 
office <1 t that time of 6,247. 
4. The public convenience and advantage would be subserved 
and promoted by the establishment of such branch at the loca-
tion proposed and there is no reason to limit the character of 
work or service to be performed at such branch. Applicant 
hdnk h,is a number of existing customers having offices in or 
places of business serving the Ogden Metropolitan Area. Fur-
thermore, the general public would be afforded the choice of 
another banking facility with substantially larger lending lim-
its than any other state bank in the area if the proposed branch 
bank is established. 
5. The Attorney General of the State of Utah in an opinion of 
law to the Commissioner dated August 15, 1968 (No. 68-055), 
a copy of which is attached hereto, has ruled that as a matter 
of law a branch bank may not be established by the applicant 
bank at the location proposed and the Commissioner deems it 
proper to follow such opinion and, accordingly, deny the appli-
cation on the basis of the ruling of law set forth in the Attorney 
General's opinion. 
Based upon the foregoing conclusion of law, the Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions hereby makes the following 
App. V 
ORDER 
The application of Walker Bank & Trust Company for per-
mission to establish a branch bank in the City of South Ogden, 
Weber County, Utah, in the vicinity of 36th Street and Washing-
ton Boulevard is denied. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 9th day of September, 
1968. 
W. s. BRIMHALL 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
State of Utah 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
OPINION OF LAW 
No. 68-055 
Requested by W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Utah Financial 
Institutions. 
Prepared by Attorney General Phil L. Hansen and staff. 
QUESTION 
Should the Commissioner of Utah Financial Institutions find 
that the public convenience and advantage would not be subverted, 
may a branch bank be lawfully established within the corporate 
limits of South Ogden, Utah, a city of the second class in which 
no unit bank is located, but which is immediately adjacent to Og· 
den, Utah, another city of the second class in which are presently 
located five unit banks, where it is shown by the evidence that the 
primary objective of the branch bank is not to serve South Ogden, 






This opinion is given in response to a letter dated August 14, 
1968, and as a supplement to and to clarify Utah Attorney Gen-
eral Opinion No. 68-045, which was issued on the 26th day of 
July, 1968. 
The primary legislation restnct10ns in the establishment of 
branch banks in the State of Utah are: 
Except in cities of the first class, or within unincorporated 
areas of a county in which a city of the first class is located, 
no branch bank shall be established in any city or town 
in which is located a bank or banks, state or national, reg-
ularly transacting a customary banking business, unless 
the bank seeking to establish such branch shall take over 
an existing bank. No unit bank organized and operating 
at a point where there are other operating banks, state or 
national, shall be permitted to be acquired by another 
bank for the purpose of establishing a branch until such 
bank shall have been in operation as such for a period of 
five years. 
* * * No bank shall be permitted to establish any branch 
or office until it shall first have been shown to the satis-
faction of the bank commissioner that the public conven-
ience and advantage will be subserved and promoted by 
the establishment of such branch or office. 
From and after the effective date of this act no unit bank 
and no branch bank shall be established or authorized to 
conduct a banking business except as hereinbefore in sec-
tion 7-3-6 expressly provided. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the Utah State Legis-
lature has affirmatively declared that the geographical areas com-
prising municipalities in which a unit bank or banks are presently 
located, other than cities of the first class, are not open to the estab-
lishment of branch banks, other than by the so-called "take over" 
method, i.e., through the process of taking over an existing bank. 
The Utah State Legislature has further declared by the foregoing 
statutory enactments, that as additional banking facilities are 
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shown to be required to meet the needs and convenience of such 
an incorporated area, the Commissioner of Utah Financial Institu-
tions may pro\ide for such additional facilities hy iwrmitting the 
establishment of new unit banks therein, but it is abundantly clear 
that such additional banking facilities may not be provided through 
the establishment of branches. 
The wisdom of the legislative policy in thus seeking to encour-
age the unit banking system, as compared to branching, may be 
debatable in some circles, but its validity from the legal standpoint 
is no longer open to question in Utah. Further, the same limild-
tions upon branching have been applied to national banks located 
in Utah, as evidenced by the recent decisions of the United St3ks 
Supreme Court. 
This legislative policy as adapted to Utah serves a dual pur-
pose. The first such purpose is to protect existing unit banks from 
competition by out-of-city banks through the branching process. 
The second such purpose is to promote the furnishing of banking 
competition through the establishment of local unit banks. 
It appears from the facts presented in connection with the 
application of Walker Bank & Trust Company for a branch in 
South Ogden, Utah, at a location just outside the boundaries of 
Ogden, Utah, that the primary obj cc ti ve in seeking that location 
is not to serve the needs and convenience of South Ogden, Utah, 
but rather to provide a facility that will effectively compete with 
the Ogden banks in Ogden, Utah. 
Thus, the instant question resolves itself into a determination 
of whether the legislative policy, as so reflected in the foregoing 
statutes, and which policy is designed to protect Ogden, Utah, unit 
banks and others in incorporated areas similarly situated from com-
petition from out-of-city banks through branching, and which fixes 
the method for providing additional competition as the same is 
needed through new unit banks, may be evaded by the establish-
ment of a branch by Walker Bank & Trust Company in South 
Ogden, Utah; which establishment is sought, not with the nools 
and convenience of South Ogden, Utah, as the determining factor, 
but with competition with Ogden, Utah, unit banks in Ogden, 
Utah, as its primary purpose. 
App. VIII 
It is the opinion of this office that the legislative policy may not 
be cv:ided. Statutes are to be construed to give effect to legislative 
policy and to implement legislative intent. The physical location 
of a branch hank in South Ogden, Utah, and just across the 
houndary line from Ogden, Utah, where it is prohibited by law 
Jrnm loc:1ting, for the primary purpose of serving Ogden, Utah, 
:11ccl rnmpciing with the unit hanks in Ogden, Utah, is obviously 
" designed to evade the law and render nugatory the 
kgisl:itive intent. It is the opinion of this office that the establish-
nicnt of the branch under such circumstances would be unlawful, 
:md the instant application should be denied. 
Dated this 15th day of August, 1968. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. S. BRIMHALL, COMMISSIONER 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF 
THE ST A TE OF UT AH, BANK OF 
UTi\H, BANK OF BEN LOMOND, 
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK, FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A., 





Civil No. 182203 
This matter having come on regularly before the above enti-
tled court on the 10th day of December, 1968, pursuant to plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment and the matter having been 
fully argued and briefs having been submitted and the court deter-
mining that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that plaintiff is entitled to relief as prayed against the defendants 
App. IX 
and each of them as a matter of law and the court being fully 
ad vised in the premises, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY DECLARED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that the denial by the defendant W. S. Brimhall 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, of 
application of Walker Bank & Trust Company for the establish-
ment of a branch bank in the City of South Ogden, Weber County, 
Utah (which decision was dated September 9, 1968) is hereby de-
clared to be erroneous and not in accordance with law, that plain-
tiff's application for a branch bank at such location should have 
been granted and that such decision, being unlawful, is hereby set 
aside. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that the defendant W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner oi 
Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, be and he is hereby 
ordered and directed to grant the application of plaintiff Walker 
Bank & Trust Company for the establishment of a branch bank 
in the City of South Ogden, Weber County, Utah. 
Dated this 20th day of March, 1969. 
BY THE COURT 
App. X 
STEW ART M. HANSON 
District Court Judge 
